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The paper explores the question of whether the EU is bound by human rights 
obligations towards individuals located outside the territory of the Member 
States when it concludes trade agreements with third countries. in this light, 
the paper focuses on two concrete sub-questions: a) the question of the extra-
territorial applicability of the EU Charter of fundamental Rights; and b) the 
question of the existence of a due diligence obligation incumbent upon the EU 
institutions to examine the impact of the agreement to the human rights situa-
tion in the third State. in relation to the question of the extraterritoriality of the 
Charter, the paper argues that territorial considerations are immaterial in the 
context of determining the Charter’s applicability; what matters in this context 
is whether the situation in question is covered by an EU competence. next, the 
paper examines whether a relevant EU duty of due diligence exists –as a mat-
ter of either EU or international law. it is shown that the existence of such a 
duty under international law is far from straightforward and it involves an ex-
amination of the relevant primary norms. The paper concludes by highlighting 
that, as a matter of EU law, a duty of due diligence to take into account the 
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1. introduction
is the EU bound by human rights obligations towards individuals outside the 
territory of its Member States1 when it concludes trade agreements with third 
countries? in the literature, even though the broader issue of the EU’s human 
rights obligations in its external trade policies has received some (limited) at-
tention, 2 this question has remained largely unexplored. Recent developments 
have rekindled interest in the topic.3 More particularly, the General Court’s (GC) 
judgment4 as well as the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Wathelet5 in the 
context of the Front Polisario cases before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) have provided a more solid basis for engagement with the issue 
1 for the territory of the Member states to which the EU treaties apply see art 52 TEU and 
art 355 TfEU. See also D. Kochenov, European Union Territory from a Legal Perspective: 
A Com mentary on Art. 52 TEU, 355, 349, and 198-204 TFEU, University of Groningen faculty 
of Law Working Paper 2017-05, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2956011>. See more generally on the notion of territory in EU law, P. Cardwell and 
R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations and International Law: Divergence on Questions of ‘Terri-
tory’?, in E. fahey(Ed.), Framing Convergence with the Global Legal Order: The EU and the 
World (oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020), pp. 143-161.
2 The seminal work on the topic is V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, The Extraterritorial Application 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model, 
in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, (oxford: Hart/
Beck, 2014), p. 657. See also more generally L. Bartels, The EU’s Human Rights obligations in 
relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects, 25 EJIL 1071 (2014). E. Cannizzaro, The EU’s 
Human Rights obligations in relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lorand 
Bartels, 25 EJIL 1093 (2014). A. Ganesh, The European Union’s Human Rights obligations To-
wards Distant Strangers, 37 Mich. J. Int’l L. 475 (2015). By way of contrast, the question of the 
EU’s complicity in internationally wrongful acts committed by a third State, namely the violation 
of a number of human rights of individuals located in that third State, through the conclusion of 
trade agreements with that third State under the law of international responsibility has gained 
considerable traction over the last few years. See for example: E. Kassoti, The Legality under 
international Law of the EU’s Trade Agreements covering occupied Territories: A Comparative 
Study of Palestine and Western Sahara, CLEER Paper Series 2017/3, available at <https://www.
asser.nl/media/3934/cleer17-3_web.pdf>. f. Dubuisson, The international obligations of the 
European Union and its Member States with regard to Economic Relations with israeli Settle-
ments, (2014), available at <http://www.madeinillegality.org/iMG/pdf/etude_def_ang.pdf>. for the 
procedural and evidentiary difficulties of proving complicity in international law, see o. Corten, 
P. Klein, The Limits of Complicity as a Ground for Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the Corfu 
Channel case, in K. Bannelier, T. Christakis, and S. Heathcote (eds.), The ICJ and the Evolution of 
International Law: The Enduring Impact of the Corfu Channel Case, (London: Routledge, 2012), 
pp. 315 – 334; V. Lanovoy, Complicity and its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility 
(oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) pp. 101-103, 218-234. 
3 C. Ryngaert, EU Trade Agreements and Human Rights: from Extraterritorial to Territorial 
obligations, 20 ICLR 374 (2018). A. Berkes, The Extraterritorial Human Rights obligations of 
the EU in its External Trade and investment Policies, 5 Europe and the World: A Law Review 
1 (2018). S. Hummelbrunner, Beyond Extraterritoriality: Towards an EU obligation to Ensure 
Human Rights Abroad, CLEER Paper Series 19/02, p. 23, available at <https://www.asser.nl/
media/679407/cleer_19-02_web.pdf>.
4 Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v Council of the European Union EU:T:2015:953.
5 Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front Polisario EU:C:2016:677, opinion 
of AG Wathelet. 
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of the EU’s duty to protect human rights outside the territory of its Member 
States. 
The Front Polisario case concerned an action for annulment brought by front 
Polisario, the main Saharawi national liberation movement, against the Council 
decision6 adopting the 2010 EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural, processed 
agricultural and fisheries products (‘Liberalization Agreement’)7 in so far as that 
Agreement extended to the territory of Western Sahara. According to the ap-
plicant the decision breached EU and international law.8
The GC ruled that since the Liberalisation Agreement facilitated the export 
into the EU of products originating from Western Sahara, the Council should 
have ensured that the production of the goods in question is not conducted to 
the detriment of the population of the territory and that it does not entail infringe-
ments of fundamental rights.9 At the same time, it needs to be noted that the 
GC simply assumed the extraterritorial application of the EU Charter of funda-
mental Rights (the Charter),10 namely its application vis-à-vis the peoples of the 
Western Sahara – without providing more by way of explanation. The GC con-
cluded that the Council failed to fulfil its obligation to examine all the elements 
of the case before the adoption of the Decision and thus, it annulled the 
contested Decision insofar as it approved the application of the Liberalisation 
Agreement to Western Sahara.11 on appeal, while AG Wathelet agreed that 
fundamental rights may, in some circumstances, produce extraterritorial effects, 
he argued that the conditions for the extraterritorial application of the Charter 
were not fulfilled in casu.12 While the Advocate General disagreed with the GC’s 
reliance on the Charter, he did postulate the existence of a duty of due diligence 
on the part of the EU institutions to take into account the human rights impact 
of the agreement in the territory of the third State before actually concluding it.13 
According to the AG, this due diligence obligation is incumbent upon the EU 
institutions on the basis of both EU and international law.14 The CJEU did not 
have an opportunity to pronounce on the matter since it concluded, on the basis 
 6 Council Decision 2012/497/EU of 8 March 2012 on the conclusion of an Agreement in 
the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco 
concerning reciprocal liberalization measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural 
products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and their Annexes 
and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, 
of the other part [2012] oJ L241/2.
 7 Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and 
the Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalization measures on agricultural products, 
processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 
3 and their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part [2012] oJ L241/4.
 8 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, para. 117. 
 9 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, paras. 228, 241.
10 Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] oJ C 326/391.
11 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, paras. 242-248.
12 opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, paras. 270-272.
13 Ibid. paras. 254-269.
14 Ibid. 
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of relevant international law rules applicable between the parties (namely the 
EU and Morocco), that neither the EU-Morocco Association Agreement15 nor 
the Liberalization Agreement were intended to cover the territory of Western 
Sahara – and it quashed the GC’s judgment.16 Thus, although the precedential 
value of the GC’s judgment is limited due to the exigencies of the case, the 
question of whether the EU is bound by human rights obligations towards distant 
strangers when it concludes trade agreements with third countries still looms 
large. 
on this basis, the purpose of this contribution is to revisit this question in the 
light of the Front Polisario case. in order to do so, the contribution will focus on 
two concrete sub-questions that this new jurisprudential development gives rise 
to: a. the question of the extraterritorial applicability of the Charter of funda-
mental Rights; and b. that of the existence of a due diligence obligation incum-
bent upon the EU institutions to examine the impact of the agreement on the 
human rights situation in the third State. 
2. The Extraterritorial Applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: The irrelevance of notions of Territoriality in Defining the 
Charter’s scope of Application
in contrast to some human rights instruments, the Charter does not contain a 
clause defining its territorial scope. Articles 52 TEU and 355 TfEU are of little 
avail in establishing the territorial scope of the Charter since they merely define 
the Member States’ territory to which the TEU and the TfEU apply.17 in a 
similar vein, the Charter’s applicability has not been conditioned upon the thresh-
old criterion of jurisdiction.18
in lieu of a jurisdictional clause, the Charter only contains a provision stipulat-
ing its field of application. Art. 51(1) of the Charter specifies that the provisions 
15 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Com-
munities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part 
[2000] oJ L70/2.
16 Case C-104/16 P Council of the European Union v Front Polisario EU:C:2016:973, paras. 
81-115. for comment see E. Kassoti, The Council v Front Polisario Case: The Court of Justice’s 
Selective Reliance on Treaty interpretation, 2 European Papers 23 (2017). J. odermatt, Council 
of the European Union v. front Populaire pour la Libération de la Saguia-El-Hamra et Du Rio de 
oro (front Polisario). Case C-104/16P, 111 AJIL 731 (2017). 
17 V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, supra note 2, p. 1664. for analysis of arts 52 and 355 TfEU, 
see D. Kochenov, supra note 1.
18 See for example Art 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and fundamental freedoms (‘ECHR’): “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section i of this Convention.” European 
Convention of Human Rights (adopted 4 november 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), 
available at <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_EnG.pdf>. Art 2 of the internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘iCCPR’): “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant…” international Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), available at <https://
www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>. See also generally C. Ryngaert, Juris-
diction in International Law, 2nd ed., (oxford: oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 22-26. 
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of the Charter “are addressed to the institutions of the Union … and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”19 The wording of 
Art. 51(1) of the Charter suggests that the application of the Charter has been 
defined exclusively rationae materiae:20 since the Charter applies to acts of the 
institutions of the Union and to national acts implementing EU law,21 the crux of 
the matter is whether a situation is covered by an EU competence.22 
in this sense, Art. 51(1) of the Charter envisages a parallelism between EU 
action and application of the Charter.23 The only limitation contained in the 
relevant provision pertains to the material scope of the Charter – which has 
been limited in so far as action by Member States is concerned.24 As the Court 
explained in its seminal judgment in Akerberg Fransson: “[S]ituations cannot 
exist which are covered … by European Union law without those fundamental 
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails the ap-
plicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”25
This construction suggests that territorial criteria bear no relevance in the 
context of determining the applicability of the Charter.26 in this light, the model 
propounded by Moreno-Lax and Costello in 2014 still holds great explanatory 
19 in the Explanations to the Charter it is also stressed that Art. 51 of the Charter “seeks to 
clearly establish that the Charter applies primarily to the institutions and bodies of the Union”, 
whereas Member States are only bound by the Charter “when they act in the scope of Union 
law.” Explanations Relating to the Charter of fundamental Rights [2007] oJ C 303/17, p 32. for 
commentary on Art. 51, see A. Ward, Article 51, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), supra note 2, p. 1413 at 
pp. 1413-1454. 
20 T. Van Danwitz, K. Paraschas, A fresh Start for the Charter: fundamental Questions on the 
Application of the European Charter of fundamental Rights, 35 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1396 (2017), 
p.1399. According to Tridimas: “The Charter does not apply unless a situation is governed by 
Union law by virtue of a connecting factor other than the Charter … nonetheless, within the am-
bit of EU law, there is no limitation rationae materiae in the scope of application of the Charter.” 
T. Tridimas, fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU law, and the Charter, 16 Camb. Yearb. 
Eur. Leg. Stud. 361 (2014), 381. 
21 on what constitutes ‘implementation of Union law’ by the Member States, see generally 
B. Pirker, Mapping the Scope of Application of EU fundamental Rights: A Typology, 3 European 
Papers 133 (2018). 
22 V. Kube, EU Human Rights, International Investment Law and Participation: Operational-
izing the EU Foreign Policy Objective to Global Human Rights Protection, (Berlin: Springer, 2019), 
at p. 34. for the relevance of a competence-based reading of the scope of the Charter, see the 
opinion of Advocate General Bot in opinion 1/17, ECLi:EU:C:2019:72, para. 195: “[i]t is neces-
sary to clarify that it follows from the second sentence of Article 207(1) TfEU, read in conjunction 
with Article 21 TEU, that the European Union must, when exercising the competences conferred 
on it by the EU and fEU Treaties, including those relating to the common commercial policy, 
respect fundamental rights, of which the principle of equal treatment forms part. The European 
Union is a union based on the rule of law in which all acts of its institutions are subject to review 
of their compatibility with, in particular, the Treaties, general principles of law and fundamental 
rights.”
23 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium Case, opinion of AG Mengozzi, EU:C:2017:173, 
para 91. 
24 Ibid., para. 97. Joined cases C-8/15 P, C-9/15P and C-10/15P Ledra Advertising Ltd et al v 
European Commission and European Central Bank, EU:C:2016:701, opinion of AG Wahl, para. 
85. 
25 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v. Akerberg Fransson, ECLi:EU:C:2013:105, para 21. See also 
Case C-390/12 Robert Pfleger and Others, ECLi:EU:C:2014:281, para 34. 
26 V. Kube, supra note 22, at pp. 34-36. 
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force. According to them: “The scope of application ratione loci of the Charter 
is … to be determined by reference to the general scope of application of EU 
law, following autonomous requirements. The Charter applies to a particular 
situation once EU law governs it. There is no additional criterion, of a territorial 
character or otherwise, that needs to be fulfilled in this context.”27 Advocate 
General Mengozzi also shared this view in his opinion in X and X v. Belgium. 
The case concerned a request for a short-term visa (visa with limited territorial 
validity) on the basis of Art. 25 of the Visa Code28 submitted at the Belgian 
Embassy in Lebanon by a Syrian family living in Aleppo.29 According to Mengozzi, 
Art. 51(1) implies that the fundamental rights recognised by the Charter “are 
guaranteed … irrespective of any territorial criterion. if it were to be considered 
that the Charter does not apply where an institution or a Member State imple-
menting EU law acts extraterritorially, that would amount to claiming that situa-
tions covered by EU law would fall outside the scope of the fundamental rights 
of the Union” – thereby undermining the parallelism between EU action and 
application of the Charter envisaged under Art. 51(1) of the Charter.30 Although 
the CJEU found that the Charter was not applicable in casu, this was done on 
the ground that Art. 25 of the Visa Code did not apply to the situation at hand 
since the x family were intending to stay in Belgium for more than 90 days – and 
not on the basis of absence of a territorial link with the EU. According to the 
Court: “Since the situation at issue in the main proceedings is not … governed 
by EU law, the provisions of the Charter … do not apply to it.”31 Thus, although 
the Court did not address the question of extraterritorial applicability of the 
Charter expressly, it did (at least indirectly) link the question of applicability of 
the Charter solely to the question of whether the situation at the bar falls within 
the scope of EU law. 
The GC’s judgment in Front Polisario further attests to the rejection of any 
territorial considerations as a precondition for the applicability of the Charter. 
According to the GC, the Council, in concluding an agreement with a third State 
must examine all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the agreement does 
not impact the enjoyment of fundamental rights abroad.32 in other words, ac-
cording to the GC, the Union institutions bear extraterritorial obligations under 
the Charter since their actions may entail infringements of fundamental rights 
abroad.33
27 V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, supra note 2, pp. 1679-1680. 
28 Art. 25(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) no 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), oJ [2009] L243/1. 
29 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium EU:C:2017:173, para. 19. 
30 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium Case, opinion of AG Mengozzi, supra note 23, 
paras. 89, 92. (Emphasis in the original). 
31 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v. Belgium, supra note 29, para. 45. 
32 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, para. 228. 
33 o. De Schutter, The implementation of the Charter of fundamental Rights in the EU insti-
tutional framework, november 2016, study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Constitutional Affairs, at p. 57, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2016/571397/iPoL_STU(2016)571397_En.pdf>. C. Ryngaert, supra note 2, p. 81.
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The case-law of the CJEU regarding targeted sanctions against individuals 
located abroad34 further supports the proposition that territorial considerations 
are immaterial in determining the applicability of the Charter and that the only 
relevant question in this context is whether an entity has been affected by EU 
action.35 There is more case-law to bear out this proposition. The Mugraby case 
concerned an action for damages in respect of injuries that occurred because 
of the failure of the EU to adopt appropriate measures against Lebanon (sus-
pending aid programmes) under a human rights clause in the EU-Lebanon 
Association Agreement following Lebanon’s fundamental rights violations.36 
While the action failed on the merits, the Court did not question the applicants’ 
assumption that the EU may bear responsibility vis-à-vis a non-EU national for 
violation of his/her fundamental rights in a third country.37 finally, in this context, 
mention should be made of the Zaoui case involving an action for damages for 
the loss of a family member killed by Hamas.38 According to the applicant, the 
34 The fact that cases involving targeted sanctions enforced in the territory of a State party 
against individuals located abroad have not, thus far, raised any issues of ‘jurisdiction’ within the 
meaning of Art. 1 ECHR in the context of ECtHR case-law (see for example Nada v. Switzerland, 
App. no. 10593/08, 12 September 2012), does not necessarily mean that they do not raise issues 
of extraterritoriality. for criticism of the ECtHR’s sidestepping of the question of extraterritoriality of 
the ECHR in the Nada judgment, see M. Milanovic, European Court Decides nada, 23 february 
2012, available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-nada-v-switzerland/>. This is 
especially the case if one takes into account the definition of extraterritorial obligations contained 
in Clause 8(a) of the Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial obligations of States in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), available at <https://www.etoconsortium.org/
nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23>. 
Clause 8(a) of the Maastricht Principles defines extraterritorial obligations as “obligations relating 
to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoy-
ment of human rights outside of that State’s territory.” (Emphasis added). See also M. Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, (oxford: oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 7: “Extraterritorial application simply means that at the moment of the 
alleged violation of his or her human rights the individual concerned is not physically located in the 
territory of the state party in question, a geographical area over which the state has sovereignty 
or title. Extraterritorial application of a human rights treaty is an issue which will most frequently 
arise from an extraterritorial state act, i.e. conduct attributable to the state, either of commission 
or of omission, performed outside its sovereign borders … However – and this is a crucial point 
– extraterritorial application does not require an extraterritorial state act, but solely that the indi-
vidual concerned is located outside the state’s territory.” (Emphasis in the original). See contra A. 
Sicilianos, The European Court of Human Rights facing the Security Council: Towards Systemic 
Harmonization, 66 ICLQ 783 (2017), p. 793. 
35 A. Ward, supra note 19, p. 423: “[E]merging case-law shows that once the legal interests 
of an entity have been affected by EU law, and it is pertinent to the resolution of a dispute, 
then the Charter will apply, even if that entity is located outside of the EU.” V. Kube, supra note 
22, p. 4. in case C-200/13 P Council of the European Union v. Bank Saderat Iran, ECLi:EU:C: 
2016:284, para. 47, the Court stated that: “Bank Saderat iran puts forward pleas alleging an 
infringement of its rights of defence and of its right to effective judicial protection. Such rights 
may be invoked by any natural person or any entity bringing an action before the Courts of 
the European Union.” See also case T-494/10 Bank Saderat Iran v. Council of the European 
Union, ECLi:EU:T:2013:59, paras. 34-44; case C-176/13 P Council of the European Union v. Bank 
Mellat, ECLi:EU:C:2016:96, para. 49; case C-130/10 European Parliament v. Council of the 
European Union, ECLi:EU:C:2012:472, para 83. 
36 Case C-581/11 P Mugraby v. Council of the European Union, ECLi:EU:C:2012:466. 
37 Ibid., para 81. L. Bartels, supra note 2, p. 1076. V. Kube, supra note 22, p. 35.
38 Case C-288/03 P Zaoui and Others v. Commission, ECLi:EU:C:2004:633. 
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EU was responsible because of its funding of education in Palestinian territory 
which allegedly incited hatred and thus led to the attack. Although the action 
failed because the applicants did not manage to prove causality, the Court 
(again) did not question the assumption that the EU could be held responsible 
for extraterritorial violations of fundamental rights.39 
furthermore, different EU instruments show that Union institutions remain 
bound by the Charter even when they act outside the territory of EU Member 
States. A prime example here is Regulation 2016/1624 on the European Border 
and Coast Guard.40 According to the Regulation, in performing its tasks, which, 
inter alia, expressly include training41 and co-ordination of border management 
activities in the territory of third States,42 the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency “shall guarantee the protection of fundamental rights … in accordance 
with relevant Union law” and “in particular the Charter.”43 More interestingly for 
present purposes, the Commission’s Guidelines on the analysis of human rights 
impacts in impact assessments for trade-related policy measures44 lend further 
support to the argument advanced here. The Guidelines highlight that the pur-
pose of identifying human rights impacts is to assess “how trade measures 
which might be included in a proposed trade-related policy initiative are likely 
to impact: either on the human rights of individuals in the countries or territories 
concerned; or on the ability of the EU and the partner country/ies to fulfil or 
progressively realise their human rights obligations.”45 De Schutter stressed, in 
a 2016 study commissioned by the European Parliament, that this “confirms the 
understanding (illustrated by the Front Polisario case …) that fundamental rights 
that are binding in the EU legal order should be complied with also for the ben-
efit of individuals situated outside the territories of the Member States: such 
fundamental rights have in other terms, an ‘extraterritorial’ scope…”.46 in this 
context, it is also worthwhile noting that the Guidelines explicitly provide that: 
“Respect for the Charter of fundamental rights in Commission acts and initiatives 
is a binding legal requirement in relation to both internal policies and external 
action.”47
overall, the existing case-law on the extraterritorial application of the Charter 
as well as several EU instruments support the conclusion reached above on 
the basis of a textual analysis of Art. 51(1). Whether or not the EU institutions 
39 Ibid., paras 3, 13-15. L. Bartels, supra note 2, p. 1076. V. Kube, supra note 22, p. 35. 
40 Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 
2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard amending Regulation 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation no 863/2007 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, Council Regulation no 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 
oJ[2016] L251/1.
41 Ibid., Art. 36(7). 
42 Ibid., Art. 54(1) – (3). 
43 Ibid., Art. 34(1). 
44 European Commission, Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact 
assessments for trade-related policy measures, 2 July 2015, available at <https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153591.pdf>.
45 Ibid., p. 2 (Emphasis added). 
46 o. De Schutter, supra note 33, p. 2. 
47 Ibid., p. 5. (Emphasis in the original). 
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exercise their powers within the territory of the Member States is immaterial; 
what matters in the context of triggering the applicability of the Charter is wheth-
er the situation at hand is covered by an EU competence. 
3. The Extraterritorial Applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: importing the ECtHR’s model of Effective Control?
As seen above, there is sustained practice to support the view propounded by 
Moreno-Lax and Costello to the effect that the Charter reflects “an assumption 
that EU fundamental rights simply track all EU activities, as well as Member 
State action when implementing EU law.”48 However, this view has not gone 
unchallenged. others have argued that the equivalence of meaning and scope 
between the rights of the Charter and the corresponding rights of the ECHR, 
provided for under Art. 52(3) of the Charter,49 allows the transposition of the 
jurisdictional clause of Art. 1 ECHR to the fundamental rights regime of the 
Charter. This is the approach followed by Advocate General Wathelet in his 
opinion in the Front Polisario case before the CJEU.50 The Advocate General 
applied by analogy the ECtHR’s effective control standard and concluded that 
the Charter would apply “where an activity is governed by EU law and carried 
out under the effective control of the EU and/or its Member States but outside 
their territory.”51
There are many reasons militating against the ‘importation’ of the effective 
control standard developed by the ECtHR. As Ryngaert observes, the develop-
ment of this particular extraterritoriality standard by the ECtHR has been to a 
large degree influenced by the type of cases that have come before the court 
in question, namely extraterritorial military operations conducted by ECHR con-
tracting parties.52 Such cases typically involve State conduct outside its terri-
tory and thus, the development of the effective control standard in order to 
determine the reach of the Convention is, arguably, logical in this particular 
context. However, as Ryngaert stresses “normally the EU will not engage in 
48 V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, supra note 2, p. 1658. 
49 Art 52(3) of the Charter stipulates that: “in so far as this Charter contains rights which corre-
spond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”
50 opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in case C-104/16 P, supra note 5. See also E. Guild, 
S. Carrera, L. Den Hertog, J. Parkin, implementation of the EU Charter of fundamental Rights 
and its impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies: frontex, Europol and the European asylum Sup-
port office, report requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs, (2011) European Parliament Directorate General for internal Policies Policy 
Study pp. 48-50, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=iPoL-
LiBE_ET(2011)453196>.
51 opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in case C-104/16 P, supra note 5, para. 270 and 
fn. 24 citing relevant ECtHR case-law regarding the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. (Em-
phasis added). 
52 C. Ryngaert, supra note 2, p 382. M. Milanovic, supra note 34, pp. 118-127. for an over-
view of the relevant case-law see the fact-sheet of the ECtHR on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of 
States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR, July 2018) <https://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/fS_Extra-territorial_jurisdiction_EnG.pdf>.
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such extraterritorial conduct, but rather take decisions that may have extrater-
ritorial effects.”53 The factual scenario of the Front Polisario case, involving the 
conclusion of a trade agreement with a third State that might have affected the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights by individuals in that third State, attests to the 
inappropriateness of extrapolating from this strand of ECtHR case-law.
in this context, it would seem more apt to derive guidance from the ECtHR’s 
case-law involving measures with extraterritorial effect – rather than focusing 
on the Court’s jurisprudence involving extraterritorial conduct. However, as 
Bartels notes, while there is a plethora of judgments regarding the application 
of the ECHR to extraterritorial conduct, cases regarding its application to mea-
sures with extraterritorial effects are not only few and far between but also 
contradictory.54 The examples furnished by Bartels highlight this point. in Kovačić, 
the ECtHR acknowledged the principle that when “acts of the [State’s] authori-
ties continue to produce effects, albeit outside [that State’s] territory, … such 
that [State’s] responsibility under the Convention could be engaged.”55 Con-
versely, in Ben El Mahi, the Court found inadmissible an application against 
Denmark for permitting the publication of allegedly offensive caricatures of the 
Prophet Muhammad since there was no jurisdictional link between the applicants 
[a Moroccan national resident in Morocco and two Moroccan associations based 
and operating in Morocco] and Denmark. 56 Thus, according to the Court in Ben 
El Mahi, persons affected by a measure adopted by a contracting party are not 
considered as falling within its jurisdiction – a proposition that is hard to recon-
cile with the principle established in Kovačić.57 overall, the ECtHR has gener-
ated some inconsistent case-law on extraterritoriality – and thus, it may, in 
practice, be of little guidance in ascertaining the outer boundaries of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction.58 
There are further reasons to reject the transposition of the extraterritoriality 
standard developed by the ECtHR. it needs to be noted that there is no textual 
support for this argument. Art. 51 of the Charter, which expressly purports to 
prescribe its field of application, makes no reference to territory or jurisdiction 
as a threshold criterion for the applicability of the Charter.59 More particularly, 
53 C. Ryngaert, ibid.
54 L. Bartels, supra note 2, p. 1077. 
55 Kovačić and Others v Slovenia App nos 44574/98, 45133/98, 48316/99, (ECtHR, Decision 
on Admissibility, 09 october 2003 and 1 April 2004), p. 55.
56 Ben El Mahi and Others v Denmark App no 5853/06 (ECtHR, 11 December 2006). 
57 L. Bartels, supra note 2, p. 1077.
58 See in general M. Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EJIL 121 (2012). 
59 Art 51 of the Charter reads: “1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institu-
tions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity 
and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with 
their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in 
the treaties. 2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the pow-
ers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify the powers and tasks 
as defined in the Treaties.” See also the Explanations Relating to the Charter of fundamental 
Rights [2007] oJ C 303/17, p. 32. 
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nothing in the Charter itself (or in the Explanations thereto), justifies the imposi-
tion of a superadded jurisdictional condition to its applicability. 
one could argue that the equivalence of meaning and scope between the 
rights of the Charter and the corresponding rights under the ECHR, provided 
for under Art. 52(3) of the Charter, entails that the limitations to ECHR rights (in 
concreto the jurisdictional limit of art 1 ECHR) should also apply to the Charter 
as a whole. This position was adopted by the Belgian government in the X and 
X v. Belgium case.60 As the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in the same 
case stresses, this view is erroneous on a number of grounds. More particu-
larly, this position conflates the question of applicability of the Charter61 (name-
ly, its field of application as provided for under Art. 51 of the Charter) with that 
of the scope and content of the obligations enshrined therein62 (namely, the 
scope and interpretation of the Charter rights as provided for under Art. 52 of 
the Charter).63 Simply put, Art. 52(3) of the Charter merely enshrines the rule 
that “the law of the ECHR prevails where it guarantees protection of the funda-
mental rights at a higher level.”64 As the text of Art. 52 and the Explanations 
thereto make clear, the rights of the ECHR and the relevant case-law of the 
ECtHR are relevant in the context of interpretation of the Charter rights to the 
extent that the Charter provisions correspond to those of the ECHR.65 A contrario, 
in so far as the Charter does not correspond to the ECHR (and Art. 51 which 
pertains to the Charter’s field of application certainly does not), no equivalence 
between the two instruments is envisaged.
furthermore, Art. 52(3) of the Charter specifies that the equivalence of mean-
ing and scope between the rights of the Charter and the corresponding rights 
of the ECHR “shall not prevent Union law from providing more extensive protec-
tion.” As the Explanations to Art. 52 of the Charter make clear, this caveat against 
a ‘lock, stock and barrel’ transposition of the meaning and scope of ECHR rights 
is an expression of the autonomy of the EU legal order which allows for diver-
gences from the ECHR (provided that the level of protection afforded by the 
Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR).66 if one ac-
cepts that the ‘scope and meaning’ of the rights enshrined in the Charter (Art. 
52(3) of the Charter) also encompass the jurisdictional limit of Art. 1 ECHR, this 
would mean that the EU is required to apply to Charter rights the exact same 
limitations as those accepted in the scheme of the ECHR.67 This reading of Art. 
52(3) of the Charter would not only render the explicit reference to the Union’s 
ability to guarantee more extensive protection redundant,68 but it would also 
60 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium EU:C:2017:173, see also the opinion of AG 
Mengozzi, supra note 23, para. 95. 
61 See the text of art 51 Charter and the Explanations thereto. 
62 See the text of art 52 Charter and the Explanations thereto. 
63 opinion of AG Mengozzi, supra note 23, para 101. 
64 Ibid., para. 98.
65 See art 52(3) of the Charter of fundamental Rights [2012] oJ C 326/391, see also Expla-
nations to the Charter, supra note 19, p. 33. 
66 Ibid.
67 opinion of AG Mengozzi , supra note 23, para. 99.
68 Ibid.
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undermine the Charter’s aspiration to contribute to an autonomous EU funda-
mental rights regime.69
4. Territorialising the obligation to Respect Human Rights Abroad: 
The Soering model
The previous sections showed that there is abundant evidence to support the 
proposition that territorial considerations are immaterial in ascertaining the ex-
traterritorial applicability of the Charter and what matters in this context is wheth-
er a situation is covered by an EU competence. furthermore, it was shown that 
attempts to ‘import’ the ECtHR’s extraterritoriality standard fall short of convinc-
ing on numerous grounds. 
However, in the literature, there have been calls to move away from the (still 
nebulous) concept of extraterritoriality of the human rights obligations owed by 
the EU to distant strangers and to approach the question through the lens of a 
territorial due diligence obligation of the EU to examine the human rights situ-
ation in the territory of the third State.70 According to Ryngaert, reframing the 
debate in terms of territorial due diligence obligations would have the benefit of 
avoiding “the need for complicated doctrinal constructions of extraterritorial 
obligations, …”.71 According to this line of argumentation, the decision on the 
conclusion of an international agreement by the EU remains essentially a ter-
ritorial one and as such it triggers a (territorial) obligation to take into account, 
before the decision’s adoption, the agreement’s compatibility with human rights 
law or its effects on the enjoyment of human rights abroad.72
Ryngaert’s model of territorialisation of the EU’s human rights obligations 
towards distant strangers draws inspiration from and builds upon73 the ECtHR’s 
line of reasoning in the Soering case.74 The case raised the question of wheth-
er extradition of an individual to a third State where he could face the death 
penalty constituted a violation of Art. 3 ECHR which prohibits torture and inhu-
man or degrading treatment. While the ECtHR stressed that the notion of juris-
diction laid down in Art. 1 ECHR is essentially territorial, it did establish the 
existence of a territorial due diligence obligation incumbent upon States Parties 
to take into account the foreseeable consequences of extradition that may occur 
outside their jurisdiction.75 The Court held that: 
[T]he decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue 
under Article 3 …, and hence engage the responsibility of that State, under the 
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country … in so 
69 V. Kube, supra note 22, p. 31. V. Moreno-Lax, C. Costello, supra note 2, pp. 1660, 1682. 
70 C. Ryngaert, supra note 3, pp. 383-389. 
71 Ibid., p. 383. 
72 Ibid., p. 385. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Soering v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989. 
75 Ibid., para. 86. 
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far as liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by 
the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as 
a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.76
on this basis, Ryngaert proposes to extend the territorial principle propounded 
in Soering to cover situations such as those at hand. 
However, the adoption of this territorial due diligence model is not without 
problems. first, it needs to be noted that, from a jurisdictional perspective, the 
Soering judgment is based on territoriality; in Soering (and in other extradition 
and expulsion cases more generally) the individual is actually located within the 
territory of a State party (i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of a State party). 
As Miller observes, in this line of case-law: 
[A]n individual [is] entitled to allege violation of Convention rights because the wrong-
ful act occurs either immediately before (extradition) or immediately after (expulsion) 
the individual is within a signatory state’s territory. Jurisdiction extends in these 
cases, in other words, because the wrongful act … is directly connected to the indi-
vidual’s territorial presence in a signatory state, and the signatory state is accord-
ingly responsible for the conditions under which it brings someone into its country 
and forces him to leave … it is because the individual is ultimately present in the 
state – whether as a result of extradition or pending expulsion – that related acts fall 
‘within the jurisdiction’ of signatory states under Article 1.77 
By way of contrast, situations such as those that gave rise to the Front Polisa-
rio case are essentially different: in this type of cases, the trade agreement 
concluded between the EU and the third State potentially impacts on the enjoy-
ment of human rights by individuals located outside the territory – and (thus) 
outside the jurisdiction – of Member States. in this light, any extrapolation from 
the Soering line of case-law seems misplaced. 
it is worth noting that Ryngaert himself acknowledges that the lack of pres-
ence of an individual in the territory of a Member State is problematic in the 
context of extending the Soering model to human rights violations resulting from 
the EU’s conclusion of a trade agreement with a third State.78 According to him, 
“this lack of actual presence need however not be fatal to a finding of jurisdiction.”79 
Borrowing from the line of arguments put forward by Jackson in the context of 
expanding the Soering doctrine to cases of state complicity in torture abroad,80 
Ryngaert claims that “it would be absurd for one specific form of complicity to 
be prohibited under the principle in Soering, but to ignore ‘equally consequential 
forms’, especially in light of the universal recognition of human rights.”81 Accord-
76 Ibid., para. 91. 
77 S. Miller, Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction under the European Convention, 20 EJIL 1223 (2009), at pp. 1242, 1243. (Emphasis 
in the original). 
78 C. Ryngaert, supra note 3, p. 386. 
79 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original). 
80 Ibid. See also M. Jackson, freeing Soering: The ECHR, state Complicity in Torture, and 
Jurisdiction, 27 EJIL 816 (2016), p. 828. 
81 Ibid.
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ing to him, the EU’s facilitation of serious human rights violations abroad through 
the conclusion of trade agreements could be considered as an ‘equally conse-
quential form’82 – thereby, allowing at a theoretical level at least, the extension 
of the Soering model to this type of cases. it needs to be stressed that in the 
light of the absence of relevant judicial practice, this argument remains de lege 
ferenda. in this context, it needs to be borne in mind that, in Soering, the ECtHR 
acknowledged and emphasised the special circumstances of extradition.83 Thus, 
it is questionable whether the application of the Soering doctrine in a non-ex-
tradition scenario would be legally sound. Ultimately, one wonders whether this 
approach serves its express purpose of obviating “the need for complicated 
doctrinal constructions of extraterritorial obligations”.84 indeed, although by fol-
lowing the Soering model the focus shifts to territorial (instead of extraterritorial) 
considerations, some intellectual juggling is also needed in this context. Shoe-
horning scenarios with a clear extraterritorial dimension (such as those that 
gave rise to the Front Polisario case) in a model that was specifically designed 
to cover situations with a territorial nexus somewhat detracts from the persuasive 
force of this line of thinking.
More fundamentally, this approach fails to identify the exact legal basis of 
this (territorial) obligation under EU law. in fact, the Soering – inspired model 
does not address at all the fact that, unlike the ECHR, the Charter’s applicabil-
ity has not been conditioned upon the threshold criterion of jurisdiction. in this 
light, merely extrapolating from the case-law of the ECtHR without more seems 
to neglect the fact that, as seen above, the Charter aspires to contribute to an 
autonomous EU fundamental rights regime – which radically departs from in-
ternational human rights law notions of ‘territoriality’ and ‘jurisdiction’.
5. Territorialising the obligation to Respect Human Rights Abroad: 
A Due Diligence obligation to Examine the Human Rights 
situation in the Third Country?
Although the previous section showed that the Soering-inspired territorial due 
diligence model seems to be unconvincing in our context, there have also been 
other attempts to ‘territorialise’ the EU’s duty to protect human rights abroad 
that are worth discussing here. More particularly, in the context of the Front 
Polisario case, AG Wathelet, while disagreeing with the GC’s reliance on the 
Charter, confirmed the existence of an EU obligation of due diligence pertaining 
to the need to examine the potential impact of a treaty on the human rights 
situation in a third state; an obligation which, according to the AG, stems both 
from EU and international law.85 This section will address this argument. 
As far as the existence of a duty of due diligence under EU law is concerned, 
the AG’ s argument is two-pronged. first, the AG asserted that this obligation 
82 Ibid.
83 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 74, paras. 86, 89. 
84 C. Ryngaert, supra note 3, p. 383. 
85 opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, paras. 254-269.
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results from a combined reading of Articles 3(5), 21(1)(2)(c), and 23 TEU.86 in 
his view, these articles dictate that all actions of the EU must comply with the 
principles of the rule of law, human rights and human dignity.87 While it is ques-
tionable whether Art. 23 TEU can be considered the correct legal basis to anchor 
an EU law duty of due diligence – since it merely refers back to the objectives 
of Article 21 TEU88 – the situation seems to be different when it comes to Arts. 
3(5) and 21 TEU. 
More particularly, the advent of the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the 
nexus between trade and human rights. The text of Art. 207 TfEU attests there-
to. According to Art. 207 TfEU “[t]he common commercial policy shall be con-
ducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action”. These objectives are stated in Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU – and they ex-
pressly include the promotion of human rights. Thus, as Van Elsuwege stress-
es: “[e]ven though the precise meaning of the partly overlapping provisions [Art. 
3(5) and Art. 21 TEU] may be subject to discussion, it is obvious that the inte-
gration of human rights in EU external trade relations is a constitutional obliga-
tion and not a mere policy choice.”89 The existence of an EU law duty to take 
into account human rights when the Union acts in the area of its external policies 
is further supported by the Court’s case-law on the normative weight to be at-
tached to Art. 21 TEU. in Parliament v Commission, the Court stated that:
As regards, in particular, provisions of the EU-Tanzania Agreement concerning 
compliance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect 
for human dignity, it must be stated that such compliance is required of all actions 
of the European Union, including those in the area of the CfSP, as is clear from the 
provisions, read together, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 21(2)
(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU.90 
on this basis, it is at least arguable that, under EU law, there is a duty incumbent 
upon the EU institutions to examine the human rights situation in the third State 
before concluding an agreement therewith in order to ensure that it would not 
have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights abroad.91 As the 
European ombudsman highlighted in her Decision on the EU-Vietnam free 
Trade Agreement:
EU institutions and bodies must always consider the compliance of their actions with 
fundamental rights and the possible impact of their actions on fundamental rights. 
86 Ibid., paras. 254-255. 
87 Ibid., para. 255. 
88 S. Hummelbrunner, supra note 3, p. 34. According to Hummelbrunner, Art. 3(5) TEU is not 
an appropriate legal basis in this context since it merely establishes “EU objectives on the inter-
national scene in a more general way.” Ibid.
89 P. van Elsuwege, The Nexus between Common Commercial policy and Human Rights: 
Implications of the Lisbon Treaty, in G. Van Der Loo, M. Hahn (eds.), The Law and Practice of the 
Common Commercial Policy: The First 10 Years after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Leiden: Brill, forth-
coming), p. 2, on file with the authors. 
90 Case C-263/14, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, EU:C:2016:435, 
para. 47. (Emphasis added). 
91 S. Hummelbrunner, supra note 3, p. 40. V. Kube, supra note 22, pp. 69-71. 
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This applies also with respect to administrative activities in the context of interna-
tional treaty negotiations. The EU Administration should not only ensure that the 
envisaged agreements comply with existing human rights obligations, and do not 
lower the existing standards of human rights protection, but should also aim at fur-
thering the cause of human rights in the partner countries.92
importantly, whether or not the agreement does actually bear a negative effect 
on the human rights in the third State is immaterial. What matters in this context, 
according to the AG, is the existence of an obligation “under EU law to examine 
the general human rights situation in the other party to the international agree-
ment, and more specifically to study the impact which that agreement could 
have on human rights.”93 The General Court’s judgment in Front Polisario further 
corroborates the view that, in order to fulfil its due diligence obligations, the 
Union institutions must examine the human rights situation in the third party and 
on the basis of that examination decide whether the agreement could have a 
negative impact thereon.94
Secondly, the AG based the existence of the EU’s duty of due diligence on 
an argument of effectiveness. According to Wathelet, the relevant due diligence 
obligation results from the need to give practical effect to the EU’s duty to respect 
international human rights law.
[i]t is settled case-law that the Union must respect international law in the exercise 
of its powers. it follows that, if it is not to be devoid of any practical purpose, the 
question of the conformity of the agreement at issue with international law must be 
taken into account in the prior examination of all relevant facts to be conducted by 
the institutions before concluding an international agreement.95
This argument seems to stand on thin evidentiary grounds. More particularly, 
this line of reasoning presupposes that, under international human rights law, 
there is an obligation to take into account the possible negative impact of an 
agreement on the enjoyment of human rights abroad before concluding it. How-
ever, there is no general, free-standing obligation of due diligence under inter-
national law.96 The requirement to act with due diligence only exists as a 
92 European ombudsman, Decision in case 1409/2014/MHZ on the European Commission’s 
failure to carry out a prior human rights impact assessment of the EU-Vietnam free trade agree-
ment, 26 february 2016, para. 10. (Emphasis added). for the sake of completeness, it should be 
mentioned that in her Decision in the EU-Vietnam free Trade Agreement, the European ombuds-
man found that, although Art. 21(1) and (2) TEU do not establish a legally binding obligation to 
carry out a human rights impact assessment, “it would be in conformity with the spirit of the[se] 
legal provisions … to carry out a human rights impact assessment.” Ibid., para. 11. Thus, although 
the ombudsman did not read these provisions as entailing a legally binding due diligence obliga-
tion, she did rely on them in order to support the existence of a non-binding standard of ‘good 
administration’. Ibid., para. 10. 
93 opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, para. 257.
94 Case T-512/12, supra note 4, paras. 225-228. 
95 opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, para. 256. 
96 J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, (new York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 219-232. See also generally T. Koivurova, Due Diligence, Max Planck Encyclo-
pedia of Public international Law, february 2010. on the principle of due diligence in international 
law, see J. Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law, (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
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corollary of a primary rule, and thus, it is to be established on a case-by-case 
basis – with reference to the relevant primary norms.97 Since the AG failed to 
show either the existence of a broad due diligence obligation incumbent upon 
the EU under international human rights law, or that, in concreto, the relevant 
international human rights norms encompass such a duty, the ‘effectiveness 
argument’ put forward in his opinion is unconvincing. 
Secondly, the AG inferred the existence of a due diligence obligation incum-
bent upon the EU to take into account the impact of an agreement on the human 
rights situation in the third country from international law. According to Wathelet:
in addition to the obligation under EU law to examine the general human rights situ-
ation in the other party to the international agreement, and more specifically to study 
the impact which that agreement could have on human rights, international law re-
quires actors in international law, in particular States and international organisations, 
to respect peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and erga omnes ob-
ligations.98
However, this proposition is problematic to the extent that the AG does not 
clarify the exact source of this putative international law obligation. More par-
ticularly, this argument suffers from the same weaknesses identified above. The 
AG’s thesis could only hold if either: a) one assumes the existence of a gen-
eral due diligence obligation under international law; or b) one assumes that the 
norms of international law invoked in the case at hand require the EU to conduct 
due diligence activity. 
it thus seems fairly safe to assume that indeed no broad due diligence obli-
gation exists under general international law.99 As Besson explains: “The stan-
dard of due diligence, even if it may be grounded … as a standard independent 
from the obligation it is qualifying …, cannot ground that obligation itself, and 
hence cannot give rise to a human rights duty in the first place. The conditions 
for that duty to arise have to be met independently.”100 The case-law of the iCJ 
also confirms that there is no free-standing due diligence obligation in interna-
tional law.101 As the Court stated in the Genocide case: 
97 n. McDonald, The Role of Due Diligence in international Law, 68 ICLQ 1041 (2019), 
p. 1044. S. Besson, Due Diligence and extraterritorial Human Rights obligations – Mind the 
Gap!, 9 ESIL Reflections 1 (2020), on p. 6, available at <https://esil-sedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/04/ESiL-Reflection-Besson-S.-3.pdf>. 
98 opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, para. 257. See also ibid., para 269: “ Even if the ex-
istence and enforceability of such a principle in EU law were disputed, it is clear that international 
law imposes a clear obligation on the European Union and its Member States not to recognise 
an illegal situation resulting from the infringement of principles and rules concerning fundamental 
rights and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by that infringement. 
To that end, the EU’s institutions and its Member States must examine the impact which the inter-
national agreement at issue could have on human rights.” (Emphasis added). 
99 n. McDonald, supra note 97, p. 1044. S. Besson, supra note 97, p. 6. 
100 S. Besson, ibid. 
101 See McDonald’s analysis of the relevant iCJ jurisprudence in n. McDonald, supra note 
97, pp. 1045-1048. McDonald’s analysis focuses in particular on the Corfu Channel case, ICJ 
Reports 1949, p. 4; the Pulp Mills case, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14; the Armed Activities on the Ter-
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The Genocide Convention is not the only instrument providing for an obligation on 
the states parties to it to take certain steps to prevent the acts it seeks to prohibit. 
Many other instruments include a similar obligation, in various forms … The content 
of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another, according to the word-
ing of the relevant provisions, and depending on the nature of the acts to be pre-
vented. The decision of the Court does not, in this case, purport to establish a 
general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other 
binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to prevent certain acts.102
in the absence of a broad due diligence obligation under general international 
law, one must examine whether the applicable norms in each case prescribe 
such a duty. in the particular context of the Front Polisario case, there seems 
to be no evidence that the relevant international law norms103 involve a due 
diligence requirement. Thus, while it is arguable that under EU law there is a 
due diligence obligation to take into account the possible negative impact of the 
agreement on the human rights situation in the third country, the existence of a 
similar duty under international law is to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
– depending on the primary norms invoked in each case. 
6. Conclusions
The paper explored the question of whether the EU is bound by human rights 
obligations towards individuals located outside the territory of the Member States 
when it concludes trade agreements with third countries. Recent case-law of 
the CJEU, and more particularly the Front Polisario saga, has rekindled interest 
in the topic. Thus, the paper focused on two concrete sub-questions that this 
line of case-law has given rise to: a) the question of the extraterritorial applica-
bility of the EU Charter of fundamental Rights; and b) the question of the exis-
tence of a due diligence obligation incumbent upon the EU institutions to 
examine the impact of the agreement to the human rights situation in the third 
State.
in relation to the question of the extraterritorial applicability of the Charter, it 
was shown that territorial criteria bear no relevance in determining the Charter’s 
applicability. More particularly, the paper argues that what matters in this context 
is whether the situation at hand is covered by an EU competence. The paper 
then went on to discuss efforts that have been made in the literature to import 
into the fundamental rights regime of the Charter the extraterritoriality standard 
developed by the ECtHR. it was shown that this approach is erroneous to the 
extent that it fails to take into account that, contrary to other human rights instru-
ments, the Charter does not contain a superadded jurisdictional condition for 
its applicability and that this approach undermines the Charter’s aspiration to 
create an autonomous fundamental rights regime.
ritory of the Congo case, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168; and the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43. 
102 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
case, ibid., para. 429. 
103 for the relevant norms, see opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 5, paras. 258-259. 
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Against this background, the paper turned next to different attempts to ‘ter-
ritorialise’ the EU’s duty to protect human rights abroad by advocating in favour 
of the existence of a relevant EU duty of due diligence – allegedly stemming 
both from EU and international law. it was shown that it is complex to establish 
the EU’s obligation to act with due diligence in the context of concluding an 
international agreement on the basis of international law. in order to do that, 
one must examine the relevant primary norms involved and the extent to which 
these norms contain a due diligence requirement. on the other hand, this con-
tribution argues that a duty of due diligence clearly exists as a matter of EU law 
to take into account the impact of a future agreement on the human rights situ-
ation in the third State. 
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